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<a> Introduction 
Imagine a region made by great neighbourhoods […] places where 
residents of diverse income, ages, and backgrounds have the option to walk 
to nearby shopping, parks, and schools; where streets are safe to walk 
along and public spaces are beautiful, inviting and frequented; and where 
people can choose to take a train or a bus to their destinations easily and 
conveniently as a car (Dittmar and Poticha 2004, p.20). 
The vision of good life explained by Dittmar and Poticha (2004) in ‘The New Transit Town’ 
describes what planning and urban design principles of transit oriented development (TOD) 
might look like. However, what is not emphasized enough is an important precondition to 
make TOD happen, that is to have an effective, often rail based, public transport system. 
Funding these infrastructures, especially in times of austerity, becomes one of the crucial 
challenges for many cities seeking more sustainable futures.  
This chapter concerns the funding of public transport in the context of TOD and, in 
particular, how it was tempted to fund a metro lines through property development value 
capture techniques around metro stations in the Italian city of Turin. It speaks to the fourth 
stage of Newman and Kenworthy’s (1999) strategy to transform car-dependent cities into 
sustainable ones, namely ‘to extend the transit system into poorly served suburbs [...] and to 
build urban villages around them [...] only if it can involve land development at stations to 
pay for it’ (1999, pp.186-188). More recently, Newman et al. (2017) developed this idea by 
envisaging new tools for a potentially financially self-sustainable public-private partnership 
(PPP). Nevertheless, development-based value capture techniques are not easy as they 
require a time-consuming process to integrate urban and transport planning with land policy 
that must withstand the volatility of the property market. The aim of this chapter is to clarify 
how development-based value capture works. In the following sections, complex 
interactions between land use and transport integration, on the one hand, and land policy, on 
the other hand, are examined. The chapter then explores these ideas in a specific case study 
to understand how planning decisions and land policies applied in TOD areas have been 
mobilized to fund public transport infrastructure in Turin; to assess whether such attempts 
have been effective, and to examine how this development-based funding process could be 
improved.  
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<a> Theoretical background 
Considering this integrated transport and property development policy as a system, there are 
two main components: a public transport infrastructure, on the one hand, and some property 
developments planned around its stations, on the other. There are then two policies in the 
system which join these components in a circular way: a planning policy of land use and 
transport integration, which, to be relevant here, implies a planning decision to increment 
development rights (resulting in land value uplift); and a land policy which may capture part, 
or all of the value created. These two policies may reinforce one another, not only in terms 
of value created and captured, but also in terms of transport, as the infrastructure provides 
accessibility to the development, and the development provides ridership for the 
infrastructure. Nevertheless, this system is an open one as both the transport infrastructure 
and development component are part of a wider transport and planning policy context. 
Considered in a different way, the public transport infrastructure and development 
components are also variables of the system: the infrastructure may be modified if the system 
is not able to generate sufficient funding to pay for it; and density bonuses may be questioned 
if they are not able to generate funding, or if market demand is weak. While this 
interdependence appears to be intrinsic in entrepreneurial models of infrastructure 
development (Newman et al., 2017), it is often overlooked. Potentially, however, a 
combination of these variables can be used to achieve financial self-sustainability of the 
infrastructure development (ibid.). 
In this system, the most comprehensive policy connecting transport infrastructure and 
development is TOD. By combining the benefits of local compactness with the advantages 
of urban rails (Newman et al., 2017), TOD is considered a powerful policy in producing a 
more sustainable urban form. If well designed and projected at regional scale (Calthorpe and 
Fulton, 2001), the result is an urban environment where walking and cycling can be easily 
combined with public transport, maximizing their ‘operational complementarity’ towards 
providing sustainable mobility (Bertolini and Le Clercq, 2003; Marshal, 2005). Moreover, 
TOD features such as density, diversity and pedestrian-friendly design reduce the need for 
private mechanised travel (Cervero and Kockelman, 1997; Ewing and Cervero, 2001). At 
the same time this is a strong enabler for improving the density of the urban form, which in 
turns supports land value uplift. In contrast with car-oriented densification, which inevitably 
increases traffic congestion, thanks to the modal shift that can be induced by public transport 
infrastructure and TOD design, TOD densification around stations of a simultaneously 
developed new public transport infrastructure can break the density-congestion relationship. 
This makes denser development more sustainable and often increases land value.  
Nevertheless, there are a number of implementation barriers to successful land use and 
transport integration strategies across a range of institutional, political, legislative, financial, 
physical, social and cultural issues (Clifford et al., 2005; Marshall and Banister, 2007;  Curtis 
et al., 2009; Tan et al., 2014). Furthermore, achieving density and densification is a challenge 
for the local community opposition to it. In addition, in Italy the minimum urban standards 
for service provision (which include a land availability requirement) make densification 
processes even more difficult. For these reasons, a crucial factor for success is to have a 
3 
strong and politically supported vision to guide land use and transport integration strategies 
(Dittmar and Poticha, 2004; Cervero, 2009).  
To what are already complex policies, the funding of the public transport infrastructure using 
value capture techniques adds another layer of complexity. In times of austerity, there are 
often insufficient public resources to fund what is often expensive infrastructure. This 
concern sits in contrast with the potential financial value that can be created by infrastructure 
investment in terms of land value uplift. Hence, adding a value capture mechanism to urban 
development plans can provide the necessary funds for the development of public transport 
infrastructure, helping in this way to realise the benefits of the TOD policy. 
Land value uplift, apart from land owner investments, can be the product of ‘general 
economic or community trends’ resulting in an ‘unearned increment’, or can be ‘directly 
caused by a specific government decision related to physical development’ resulting in ‘a 
betterment’ (Alterman, 2012, p. 765). In this context, value capture is defined as the 
‘appropriation of land-value gains resulting from the installation of special public 
improvements in a limited benefit area’ (Smith and Gihring, 2006, p. 752). Thus, public 
authorities should be entitled to recapture part of land value uplift as it would be ‘a taking 
by the community, for the use of the community, of that value which is the creation of the 
community’ (George [1879]1962, p.421). Hence, different kinds of land policy mechanisms 
have been invented to capture this value. In the case of joint public transport infrastructure 
and property development, these tools are promising thanks to the compelling rationale of 
taxing the betterment created by the increased accessibility attributable to the new 
infrastructure (Medda, 2012), and the consequent land capitalisation of these accessibility 
benefits (Suzuki et al., 2015). Nevertheless, accessibility is not the only benefit created by a 
new public transport infrastructure. The effects of public transport’s additional capacity and 
of the modal shift away from traffic congestion, allow planning for additional development 
where it would have been otherwise unthinkable due to the inability of the road network to 
cope, as well as the inevitable community opposition. This further strengthens the rationale 
for value capture.   
Alterman (2012) groups value capture mechanisms into three kinds: ‘Macro, direct and 
indirect’ (p.762). ‘Macro’ tools which include ‘nationalisation of land’, ‘substitution of 
private property by long-term public leasehold’, ‘land banking’ and ‘land readjustment’ 
(p.763) were broadly used in Europe, and they are still used in Asia, also to fund public 
transport. A recent European example is Copenhagen’s Ørestad, where Ørestad New Town 
has been built on public land using a development corporation which funded, primarily 
through land sales, a 22 kilometre (km) automated metro (Milotti and Patumi, 2008; 
Peterson, 2009; Knowels, 2012). Another recognised example is railway and property joint 
development in Hong Kong, where the revenues of incredibly high-density development 
(therefore difficult to export) on public land around stations were given as grants to the metro 
operator, Mass Transit Railway Corporation (MTRC). This contributed to the substantial 
financial sustainability of the infrastructure (Cervero and Murakami, 2009; Murakami, 2012; 
Suzuki et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2015). ‘Direct’ value capture instead ‘is a wealth 
redistribution instrument’ which ‘is often regarded as a tax and require legislative authority’ 
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(Alterman, 2012, p.765). It could be ‘the capture of the unearned increment’ or ‘the capture 
of a betterment’ which could arise from ‘public infrastructure works’ or ‘land use 
regulations’ changes and includes tax on lands and real property, capital gains tax and 
different forms of betterment levies (ibid.). Finally, ‘indirect’ instruments, which are 
considered to be ‘more pragmatic’, aim ‘to leverage local governments’ authority to regulate 
land use, and solicit from land owners or developers money, land or construction services in 
exchange for additional development rights, fast-track processing, or relaxation of some 
regulations’ (Alterman, 2012, p.775). This group of instruments includes, between others, 
developer obligations or agreements, planning obligations, impact fees and cost recovery.  
As land-banking is no longer in fashion in most western countries, macro value capture tools 
are more rarely used, even if they are still effective. One solution could be the conceptual 
and legal separation of land ownership and development rights ownership, which 
development control power entails. This separation allows public authorities to build an 
alternative to land sales to recapture the value of infrastructure improvement, as they can sell 
development rights (Peterson, 2009). Good examples, in which development rights are 
disembodied from land come from South America, especially Brazil (see Smolka, 2013; and 
Peterson, 2009, Mathur, 2016) and, more pertinently for transport, from Japan (Chorus, 
2009; Suzuki et al., 2013; Suzuki et al., 2015). Land readjustment is another way to extract 
value from land ownership that can be used for infrastructure (der Krabben & Needham, 
2008), which, given its potential and rare use, was also named ‘sleeping beauty’ (Alterman, 
2012). Direct instruments, even if still used as property taxation, less often as betterment or 
value gains tax, are also in jeopardy as taxation on properties is in many countries unpopular 
among the electorate  and hence tax rise to fund public transport is politically difficult to 
implement, especially where fiscal pressure is already high, thing often associated with 
austerity. Indirect instruments are instead widely used and are considered more realistic for 
funding public services (Alterman 2012). Overall, these tools, even if promising (Suzuki et 
al., 2015), require clear enabling legislation and robust institutional capacity to be utilised 
effectively (Mathur, 2016).  
The case of Turin presented in the following sections concerns recapturing value for public 
transport funding from a planned urban intensification on public and private land around 
new stations. It is a development-based value capture approach which mixes macro and 
indirect value capture instruments in an Italian context.  
 
<a> Learning from Turin’s Line 2 of the Metro and Variante 200 
Turin is the capital of Piedmont Region, an Italian historical second-tier city in the north of 
the country, with a population of 890 529 inhabitants in the municipality and almost 2.3 
million inhabitants in the Metropolitan City area (Demo ISTAT, 2016). The number of 
households peaked in 2012 and contracted until 2016 when they stabilised (ISTAT 2018). 
Turin is a manufacturing city in post-industrial transition and was particularly affected by 
the 2008 financial crisis. The unemployment rate grew from 5.6 per cent in 2008, peaked at 
12.9 per cent in 2014, with high levels of youth unemployment, and stabilised around 9.4 
5 
per cent in 2017 (ISTAT, 2018). This was in line with the Italian average, but much higher 
than the performance of the historically stronger north of Italy (ibid.). In Turin the scarcity 
of financial resources, at both national and local level, forced the experimentation of 
innovative development-based value capture approaches in an attempt to partially fund Line 
2 of the metro. For this purpose, the new metro development was joined to a comprehensive 
regeneration strategy of the northern quadrant of the city called Variante 200 (Città di 
Torino, 2009; Città di Torino, 2010). The main feature of the strategy was the redevelopment 
and urban intensification of brown field sites around the new line stations.  
Towards the end of 2018, this attempt can be considered as a failure. Nevertheless, there is 
sufficient history of joint planning and infrastructure development in a progressively 
deteriorating macro-economic context to be investigated and learned from. An important 
characteristic of these approaches is the intrinsic interdisciplinarity and complexity. For this 
reason, the development of an integrated theoretical framework for this kind of cases was 
one of the first outcomes of the research which underpinned this chapter. One of the products 
was the definition of a diagram (Figure 5.1) to capture the systemic nature of these policies, 
working also as research protocol.  
[INSERT FIGURE 5.1] 
 
Figure 5.1 Integrating land use and transport planning and land policy for value capture.   
 
The first step is to understand the context, from the planning system and land policy tools 
available to transport infrastructure funding sources, including more intangible elements 
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such as the TOD awareness between policymakers and the political framing of value capture 
tools. Then, in this kind of integrated policy there are at least three controllable subsystems, 
which, together with the market (a fourth independent element), determine the outcome of 
the policy in terms of value capture potential. The first element that determines the 
development potential, is how the planning system reacts to the planned transit infrastructure 
by allowing for density bonuses. It can be sequential to the transport alignment decision, or 
it could be in a dynamic interaction with a more entrepreneurial approach (Newman et al., 
2017), bending the alignment to try to activate as much development potential as possible. 
The second element is land policy, which by selecting the more appropriate value capture 
instruments can determine the value capture ratio (value captured on value created). This 
part is integrated with the planning part for if development rights are created on public owned 
land the recapture ratio would be 100 per cent, while on private land it must be negotiated. 
The third element is the management of the process, which is the more delicate part as it 
usually goes beyond the traditional boundaries of the departments involved. Crucial matters 
are timing, risk allocation and the design of the financial architecture, as the resulting value 
capture potential is heavily dependent on these details. Finally, all this complex machine 
must match the property market conditions, both in terms of market values, and demand 
volume. Indeed, the quantity of development defined by the TOD planning decision may 
exceed what the market is able to absorb in the defined time frame, with dire consequences 
for the financial equilibrium of the entire strategy.  
 
Following this structure, the first information needed for Turin’s case are about its context. 
On this, most relevant is Italy’s recent history of economic stagnation and austerity, with the 
country’s debt that in 2017 was calculated to be more than 130 per cent the value of gross 
domestic product (Eurostat 2017). As a Eurozone member, Italy is subject to the European 
Growth and Stability Pact, which limits the country’s possibility to use further dept. In order 
to honour this, a national interinstitutional pact  extended to local authorities rigid limitations 
in the use of debt, making difficult to fund infrastructure, during the first years of the project. 
The second important element is the planning system. In Turin a prescriptive general land 
use plan defines in details land uses and densities and therefore land value. In terms of 
Institutional capacity, Turin’s local administration is recognised as effective. As emerged in 
interviews, the Divisione Urbanistica ed Edilizia Privata (the planning department) was 
familiar with both land use and transport integration and value capture ideas and it has been 
successful in gaining a long record of accomplishments in comprehensive regeneration 
strategies, such the Spina Centrale project and the urban transformations related to the 2006 
winter Olympics.  
In terms of planning, Turin has a joint regeneration and infrastructure development strategy, 
originating in 2007 and later named Variante 200, where a new metro line (Figure 5.2) was 
aligned purposely to trigger development opportunities in order to use value capture 
mechanisms to pay for the infrastructure. This case was a potentially good example of the 
Newman and Kenworthy (1999) strategy, or the entrepreneurial rail model (Newman et al. 
2017). The development of the northern part of the metro Line 2 was intended to be a driver 
for a comprehensive regeneration strategy of the city’s most neglected neighbourhood, 
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Barriera Milano. TOD density was to be accommodated using a general variation of the land 
use plan defined in a succession of studies and design phases strongly informed since the 
beginning by TOD principles (Città di Torino 2010; Città di Torino and To Make!, 2013a). 
Two new centres were designed: Rebaudengo, served also by the regional railway, which 
should have been the new ‘northern business gateway’ of the city, and Vanchiglia, a more 
village- like mixed use location for creative enterprises (figure 5.2). In all phases of the 
project, the TOD urban design included pyramids of density centred around stations, 
accompanied by a horizontal and vertical land use mix in a progressively improved 
pedestrian friendly public space.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5.2] 
 
 Figure 5.2. Line 2 of the Metro in Turin’s transport network    
 
On land policy, a series of value capture tools were envisaged. The main one, a macro tool, 
was based on public land ownership (brownfield) and on the planning of additional 
development rights on that land. Indirect tools were also used, according Turin’s 
Municipality consolidated practice, of extracting extraordinary planning contributions (in 
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cash, in kind or, in this case, in land) from other land owners in exchange for density bonuses 
and value enhancing change of land use. This was negotiated as 50 per cent of the land value 
uplift. Overall the envisaged value capture mechanism could have raised €201 million, 
efficiently covering about 40 per cent of the cost of the first section (the northern part) of the 
metro. During the project’s evolution, different land policy delivery tools were also 
contemplated, including an urban development corporation (Finpiemonte 2010a), and a more 
articulated structure of property funds (Città di Torino and To Make!, 2013b) that tested 
approaches to risk allocation with different timing of public land sales. In the last phase of 
the project, before it stalled, the deteriorating market conditions were factored in. Hence, a  
market driven incremental phasing of the transport and property development was suggested  
(Città di Torino and To Make!, 2013a and 2013b). This would have transferred most of the 
financial risk to the municipality, which should have funded the metro independently from 
the materialisation or not of development value.   
In terms of management, the project was opportunely-led by the planning department for all 
the phases in which it was an integrated policy. Despite the great competence of all offices 
involved, the process was contorted. One of the reasons was probably the length of the 
process compared with the length of the local council mandate. When different mayors, local 
cabinet members and the teams working on the project followed one another, even if within 
the same political majority, slight changes in priorities, values, approaches, focus and 
support for this specific policy created enough disturbance for such complex processes to 
falter. According to some respondents, the progressive abandonment of an area based 
horizontal policy integration and the return toward a more traditional vertically siloed 
governance structure was also problematic. Thus, when the deteriorated economic and 
property market conditions required a rethink of the strategy the administration failed to 
adapt. A manifestation of this was the persistent rigidity on the metro alignment and transport 
technology choice, which, treated as a political fetish, became an unsurmountable obstacle 
for the adaptation and hence deliverability of the overall integrated strategy. This rigidity, 
when some national funds became available for the technical design of the metro, brought 
also to proceed with a call for tender for the defined alignment and a phasing which 
prioritised the northern part (Città di Torino, 2016a and 2016b), which as was noted, was the 
weakest in transport terms and the less effective in creating value to be recaptured. An 
explanation is that while the progress in the new metro project was a powerful message to 
deliver to the electorate, the complexity of the dynamic interaction between factors and 
assumptions in this integrated strategy were too complex for the political decision maker.  
Nevertheless, as anticipated, the final and probably fatal weakness of the strategy came from 
the property market. The strategy entailed almost 776 000 square metres (sq.m) of public 
mixed-use development planned to be put on the market on average at an estimated value of 
2800 €/sqm for the residential, and on average at 2400 €/sqm for non-residential uses 
(Finpiemonte 2010b). Hence it was a large volume low value TOD value capture approach. 
Moreover, during the development of the project, property values fluctuated but with a 
downward trend, partly due to the global financial crisis and other demographic factors, often 
placing market property values below the development feasibility threshold. In these 
conditions, local experts considered with scepticism the possibility for the envisaged 
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development to be absorbed by the market, and particularly as the city was still dealing with 
a previous wave of oversupply. This meant that development would have required a 
prolonged and flexible market-driven phasing. Hence, the land capitalisation of the transport 
and transit-oriented densification benefits would have been difficult to determine and to cash 
upfront without discounting risk. Value capture within the defined time frame and the 
designed financial architecture was then hard to achieve.  
Eventually in 2016 the transport and the development components were separated when it 
was decided, just before local elections, to use national funds for the infrastructure design 
only. The regeneration strategy was paused. When the then administration lost the election, 
and the Five Stars Movement took over, it was decided to reconsider the entire matter. At 
that point, in June 2016, is when the observation window of this research closed, and after 
that, while the appointed team was designing the metro, the possibility of other alignments 
was reconsidered and in general the northern part of it lost priority together with the 
regeneration strategy. Indeed, the weakness of the development component made value 
capture uncertain and it would have been unwise prioritising the new metro in a part of the 
city of uncertain development.   
 
<a> Conclusion: lessons learned 
The main lesson is that these are difficult and fragile policies for the high level of complexity, 
and for the time sensitivity of the market independent variables, which contrast with the 
open-ended approach of the Italian management of planning processes. This is not a general 
institutional capacity prerequisite, that of course is needed, as Turin was renowned in Italy 
for the effectiveness of its administration. The complexity is multidimensional and the town 
planning, land policy, property development and financial architecture are as important as 
the transport component. In this kind of processes time is crucial, and the planning process 
is too slow (this may go beyond the Italian context). Moreover, the sequencing and rigidity 
of transport infrastructure planning, town planning and land policy reduced the chances for 
the project to adapt. When the worsening economic and market conditions became apparent, 
there was a call to adapt the strategy, by adjusting both the transport and regeneration 
components and by making the phasing of the infrastructure more coherent with a realistic 
market demand expectation for the property development component. In these cases, the 
transport and land use policies interaction should not crystallise too soon. By contrast, both 
the planning process and the political handling of the strategy missed the required agility.  
Market fluctuations and financial architecture are other crucial elements. Stronger market 
checks are needed, and the feasibility of the strategy should allow for safer fluctuation 
buffers. Low-value large-volume development components are more exposed to market 
volatility, putting the financial equilibrium of the strategy in jeopardy. Moreover, in these 
entrepreneurial rail development approaches, the weakness of the development component   
has also transport consequences, as the chosen new metro alignment may result in serving 
development opportunity areas for which there is little demand. This may materialise in the 
future, giving chances to the value capture mechanism to work on the long run. Nevertheless, 
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if demand is not strong and sufficiently certain in a definable time frame, it is unpractical 
and inefficient to bind together the financial equilibrium destiny of the infrastructure and 
development components, as risk would discount the value to be recaptured. In this case, 
where possible, public finance to bridge the time gap between the infrastructure cost and the 
harvesting of development value (taking also a calculated part of the risk) would be more 
effective.  
In conclusion, the research results highlight the extreme complexity of these integrated 
policies which require exceptional governance capability for a long period of time, during 
which the projects are exposed to market fluctuations and political instability, and that the 
Italian land policy framework is still not supportive enough for these strategies. Part of the 
problems and the lessons learned are bound to the Italian context, nevertheless, the analysis 
of the systemic nature of this strategy can provide a useful checklist for other contexts.  
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